We are excited to announce the Call for Papers for The 1st International Workshop on Mechanism Design in Social Networks (Mechanism.Net), a pivotal event that brings together leading researchers from multi-agent systems, algorithmic game theory, and the social, economic, and organizational sciences. Mechanism.Net 2024 is part of the IJCAI 2024 conference taking place at Jeju, South Korea from 3rd to 9th of August, 2024.
The aim of the workshop is to provide an internationally respected forum for scientific research tackling the fundamental challenges of mechanism design in social networks. As a representative interface integrating economics, game theory and artificial intelligence, mechanism design takes an engineering approach to solve a wide range of problems where there are interactions among individuals, markets and institutions. Research on mechanism design has brought many novel solutions to the practice such as spectrum allocations, kidney exchanges, student-school matching systems, and digital/sharing economy platforms. However, the traditional settings/solutions do not specifically consider the complex interactions of individuals under the social networks. Therefore, since 2017, we have seen many studies focused on the mechanism design problems under social networks, including auctions, matching, cooperative games and many other games under social networks. Almost all the traditional games/mechanisms can be revisited under the network setting and there are also many challenging open questions worth further investigations. Hence, we hope this workshop could stimulate the studies in this trend, and offer a platform to related researchers and practitioners to swiftly exchange mature and immature ideas.
Research contributions related to algorithmic game theory, mechanism design, and social choice that are considering social networks are welcome for the workshop. Topics and research questions to be explored include, but not limited to, the following:
Workshop Format. The workshop will feature invited speaker/s, paper presentations, and panel discussions. It is a one-day workshop taking place during the workshop days of IJCAI 2024.
Target Audience. The workshop will be of interest to researchers (including young masters and PhDs) engaged in modeling and analyzing economic mechanisms powered by social networks, and those interested in putting mechanism design theory to work. Mechanism.Net intends to be a place where researchers can exchange and publish mature ideas and can also quickly get useful feedback about immature results (and publish short abstracts).
All deadlines are at the end of the day specified, anywhere on Earth (UTC-12).
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We will have post-proceedings of all the accepted papers of the workshop with Springer (Communications in Computer and Information Science (CCIS)). Each accepted paper can choose to publish a full paper, a short paper or not publish at all. The goal is that if you have some new results that you want to get published quickly, the post-proceedings is a good venue. Also if you just want to get a promotion of your results but still want to send the paper to another venue, then a short paper or not publish at all is also a good choice.
Accept List | ||
0113 | Yaoxin Ge, Yao Zhang and Dengji Zhao | Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games (Extended Abstract) |
0793 | Miao Li and Yuhan Cao | Double Auction on Diffusion Network (Extended Abstract) |
0991 | Junjie Zheng, Xu Ge, Bin Li and Dengji Zhao | Sybil-Proof Mechanism for Information Propagation with Budgets |
1998 | Yuxin Zhao, Yao Zhang and Dengji Zhao | Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials (Extended Abstract) |
2778 | Bin Li and Xiaoyu Du | The Mean Externality Mechanism: A Strategy-Proof and Collusion-Proof Peer Grading Mechanism |
2791 | Bin Li and Dong Hao | Incentive Mechanism Design for ROI-Constrained Auto-Bidding |
3037 | Haoxin Liu and Yao Zhang | Distributed Mechanism Design in Social Networks (Extended Abstract) |
5269 | Thomas Ågotnes and Zoé Christoff | Cascading Power |
6329 | Bin Li and Dong Hao | Core-Competitiveness in Partially Observable Networked Market (Extended Abstract) |
6441 | Yuchen Liu, Rafik Hadfi and Takayuki Ito | Proposal of a Double Feedback Digital Product Ranking System |
9755 | Akira Matsushita | Comparison between Public and Private Signals in Network Congestion Games |
Time | Activity | Speaker |
09:00-09:05 | Opening Remarks | Dengji Zhao (in-person) |
09:05-10:05 | Tutorial: New Trends in Mechanism Design for Considering Participants’ Interactions | Dengji Zhao (in-person) |
10:05-10:30 | Invited Talk: Optimal Referral Auction Design | Swaprava Nath (online) |
10:30-11:00 | Coffee break | |
Contribution Talk: Session 1 | ||
11:00-11:25 | Sybil-Proof Mechanism for Information Propagation with Budgets | Dengji Zhao (in-person) |
11:25-11:50 | Comparison between Public and Private Signals in Network Congestion Games | Akira Matsushita (in-person) |
11:50-12:15 | Proposal of a Double Feedback Digital Product Ranking System | Yuchen Liu (in-person) |
12:15-12:30 | Core-Competitiveness in Partially Observable Networked Market | Bin Li (online) |
12:30-14:00 | Lunch break | |
14:00-14:25 | Invited Talk: Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games | Dengji Zhao (in-person) |
14:25-14:50 | Invited Talk: Strategic Behavior in Financial Networks: Equilibria and Complexity | Hao Zhou (in-person) |
Contribution Talk: Session 2 | ||
14:50-15:15 | Cascading Power | Thomas Ågotnes (in-person) |
15:15-15:40 | Truthful and Stable One-sided Matching on Networks | Tianyi Yang (online) |
15:40-16:00 | Coffee break | |
15:15-15:40 | Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials | Zixin Gu (in-person) |
16:00-16:25 | Distributed Mechanism Design in Social Networks | Haoxin Liu (online) |
16:25-16:50 | Double Auction on Diffusion Network | Miao Li (in-person) |
16:50-17:00 | Closing Remarks | Dengji Zhao (in-person) |
For more information or if you have queries relating to the workshop, please contact the Workshop Organization Committee Members: